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RECOGNIZING GESTATIONAL SURROGACY
CONTRACTS: “BABY-STEPS” TOWARD MODERN
PARENTAGE LAW IN MAINE AFTER NOLAN V.
LABREE
Adam Quinlan*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Nolan v. LaBree,1 a husband and wife filed a complaint seeking a judgment
declaring their legal parentage of a newborn child born via gestational surrogacy.2
All parties surrounding the birth of this child3 entered into a surrogacy contract and
are in agreement that the genetic mother and father bringing this suit should be
declared as the legal parents.4 When the child was born, however, the birth
certificate did not reflect the intentions of the contract, listing the parents as the
surrogate mother and the surrogate mother’s spouse.5 The trial court, following an
uncontested hearing, declared the requested paternity determination but held there
was no statutory authority permitting a similar determination of maternity and,
therefore, declined to make such a declaration.6 The plaintiffs appealed to the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, contending that the trial
court erred in its aforementioned denial of a maternity declaration based on lack of
statutory authority.7
This case brought an important issue to the Law Court regarding parentage in
artificial reproductive technique births. The issue invited the Law Court to
determine the judicial remedy with respect to parentage when a child is born via
gestational surrogacy, where the legislature has avoided such controversial topics,
creating uncertainty for both courts and families in Maine. The Law Court in
Nolan interprets the sparse statutory language in a way that ultimately provides for
a declaration of parentage in the case at hand, but the question becomes: is it
enough?
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Maine School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Jennifer
Wriggins for her advice and guidance on this case note and the Maine Law students who provided
valuable assistance throughout the process.
1. 2012 ME 61, 52 A.3d 923.
2. Id. ¶ 1. “Gestational Surrogacy” is defined as “[a] pregnancy in which one woman (the genetic
mother) provides the egg, which is fertilized, and another woman (the surrogate mother) carries the fetus
and gives birth to the child.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1582 (9th ed. 2009). Gestational surrogacy
differs from traditional surrogacy, which is defined as “[a] pregnancy in which a woman provides her
own egg, which is fertilized by artificial insemination, and carries the fetus and gives birth to a child for
another person.” Id.
3. The parties involved in the parentage issue include the gestational carrier, the carrier’s husband,
the sperm donor, and the egg donor. Nolan, 2012 ME 61, ¶ 1, 52 A.3d 923.
4. Nolan, 2012 ME 61, ¶ 1, 52 A.3d 923.
5. Id. ¶ 2.
6. Id. ¶ 3. While the court did not rule on the maternity, it did declare the genetic mother was the
de facto mother of the child and awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities to both of the genetic
parents. Id.
7. Id. ¶ 1.
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This Note considers whether the Law Court’s rationale and narrow holding,
interpreting statutory language as providing power to the courts to determine and
declare both paternity and maternity following a birth via surrogacy, is adequate, or
whether the legislature should take further action to provide concrete guidance to
both families and courts involving surrogacy arrangements where all parties are in
accord as to the identity of the intended parents. This Note next reviews the
development of surrogacy agreements and private ordering in family law within the
jurisdictions that have addressed the issue. It moves on to reveal and contrast the
multifarious approaches taken by different states. This Note then discusses the
treatment of such agreements in Maine, ultimately revealing the lack of attention
given to the area of law surrounding artificial reproductive techniques. This Note
recognizes the unwillingness to adopt comprehensive legislation on the topic but
suggests that the issues, once deemed controversial, are less controversial today
and a course of action must be embarked upon to keep pace with societal changes
and scientific developments. The ultimate recommendation proffered by this Note
is to take the first step down this path of modernizing Maine law by minimal
legislative action permitting courts to validate certain gestational surrogacy
agreements, which would in turn have the effect of automatically terminating the
parental rights of the surrogate and her husband, if any, upon the child’s birth.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF SURROGACY AGREEMENTS AND PRIVATE ORDERING
A. The History of Surrogacy Contract Law and the Proposal of Uniform Acts
Assisted reproductive techniques (ART) are fertility treatments where both the
egg and the sperm are handled.8 Specifically they involve surgically removing a
woman’s eggs, fertilizing the removed eggs with sperm in a laboratory, and
returning the eggs either to the same woman or to another, known as a gestational
surrogate.9 The use of ART has increased dramatically in recent years, doubling in
the past decade.10 The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) notes that currently,
“over 1% of all infants born in the United States every year are conceived using
ART.”11 These techniques are most commonly used by heterosexual couples who
are considered infertile, making natural reproduction an impossibility, but the
techniques are also used by gay couples and by individual women.12 Furthermore,
the ability to have a child possessing the same genetic makeup as one, or both, of
8. Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2012).
9. Id.
10. NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 2009 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES–
NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 65 (2011), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2009/PDF/ART_2009_Full.pdf (“The number of ART cycles performed in
the United States has increased, from 99,629 cycles in 2000 to 146,244 in 2009. . . . The number of
infants born who were conceived using ART also increased between 2000 and 2009. In 2009, 60,190
infants were born, which was nearly two times higher than the 35,025 born in 2000.”).
11. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 9.
12. Christine A. Bjorkman, Note, Sitting in Limbo: The Absence of Connecticut Regulation of
Surrogate Parenting Agreements and Its Effect on Parties to the Agreement, 21 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J.
141, 145 (2008).
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the intended parents makes ART an attractive alternative to adoption. 13 It is clear
that ART has been, and will most likely continue to be, an increasingly appealing
option for Americans when considering having a child.
Surrogacy can be dichotomized into traditional and gestational surrogacy.14
Traditional surrogacy involves the intended mother being artificially inseminated
with the intended father’s, or a third party donor’s, sperm.15 The practice of
gestational surrogacy differs from traditional surrogacy, as the surrogate mother
has no genetic relation to the child but plays a “purely gestational” role, consenting
to in vitro fertilization of the embryo and subsequently carrying the fetus to term.16
Regardless of the type of surrogacy, parties may choose to enter into a
surrogacy agreement providing that the surrogate mother will bear the child for the
intentional parents and further give up any rights to the child, if any, upon birth.17
The legality of such agreements was first confronted by the courts in the 1980s and
the issue of whether the agreements are lawful contractual undertakings has been
considered, albeit mostly peripherally, by numerous courts since that time.18 There
are numerous legal, medical, and ethical concerns entwined in the analysis of these
contracts19 and consequently, many decisions involving surrogacy agreements are
narrow and do not directly address the issue of legality.20 As discussed in more
detail below, approximately one-third of the states across the U.S. have recognized
the courts’ unwillingness to address such a sensitive issue and have responded by
drafting statutes that directly address surrogacy agreements.21
Two major cases brought surrogacy issues into the national spotlight and acted
as catalysts for lawmakers to encourage legislative regulation of surrogacy
agreements.22 The first and most well-known case, In re Baby M,23 involved a
traditional surrogacy agreement where the surrogate mother refused to part with the
child upon birth and consequently sought to retain custody of the child in
contravention of the surrogacy agreement.24 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
ultimately held custody did not lie with the surrogate mother,25 but, in its analysis,
looked toward the best interests of the child and not the surrogacy agreement.26
The Court found the surrogacy agreement invalid and unenforceable, as it violated
13. Id.
14. Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts,
18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391, 394 (2012); Bjorkman, supra note 12, at 145.
15. London, supra note 14, at 394.
16. Id.
17. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1583.
18. 7 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 16:22 (4th ed. 2010).
19. See Kelly A. Anderson, Certainty in an Uncertain World: The Ethics of Drafting Surrogacy
Contracts, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 615 (2008); Robert D. Arenstein, Is Surrogacy Against Public
Policy? The Answer is Yes., 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 831 (1988); Paula M. Barbaruolo, The Public
Policy Considerations of Surrogate Motherhood Contracts: An Analysis of Three Jurisdictions, 3 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 39 (1993).
20. LORD, supra note 18.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
24. Id. at 1234-37.
25. Id. at 1264.
26. Id. at 1256.
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various laws of the state regarding adoption including: “(1) laws prohibiting the
use of money in connection with adoptions; (2) laws requiring proof of parental
unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights is ordered or an
adoption is granted; and (3) laws that make surrender of custody and consent to
adoption revocable in private placement adoptions.” 27 The court also held that by
predetermining parentage of a child without taking into account the child’s best
interests, surrogacy contracts were offensive to public policy of the state.28 The
court ruled this specific agreement invalid but, noting the inevitable ethical and
moral issues involved, explicitly left the door open for legislative action to clarify
the law surrounding surrogacy contracts.29
Conversely, a few years later, the court in Johnson v. Calvert30 held that a
gestational surrogacy agreement was not, on its face, against public policy.31 The
court was posed with determining maternity in a scenario in which the birth mother
had no genetic relationship and, instead of following the analysis undertaken in In
re Baby M using the child’s best interests, the court focused largely on the intent of
the parents:
[State law] recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of
establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means do not coincide
in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who intended
to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own—is the
32
natural mother . . . .

The surrogacy agreement, being held not inconsistent with public policy, was used
to show the genetic mother’s intent, satisfying the court’s standard to obtain
parentage rights.33
Baby M and Calvert illustrate that without explicit legislative direction, courts
will be forced to handle these sensitive and difficult issues to the best of their
abilities. The cases represent the judicial tip-toeing and inconsistency in analyzing
surrogacy agreements, and consequently, the cry to legislatures to clarify surrogate
relationships.
In response to the growing use of ART and inevitable complications that
accompany it, there have been Uniform Acts proposed to provide guidance to the
state legislatures. First, in 1988, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) proposed the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act (USCACA), which provided two alternatives states could
adopt: the first alternative gave effect to gestational surrogacy agreements but only
27. Id. at 1240.
28. Id. at 1246 (“The contract's basic premise, that the natural parents can decide in advance of birth
which one is to have custody of the child, bears no relationship to the settled law that the child's best
interests shall determine custody.”).
29. Id. at 1264 (“Legislative consideration of surrogacy may . . . provide the opportunity to begin to
focus on the overall implications of the new reproductive biotechnology . . . . The problem can be
addressed only when society decides what its values and objectives are in this troubling, yet promising,
area.”).
30. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
31. Id. at 783.
32. Id. at 782.
33. Id. at 783.
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under limited and prescribed circumstances and the second alternative simply held
such agreements void.34 These provisions were limited and failed to fully address
parentage rights for children born through ART, and as a result, were ignored by
most states.35
The USCACA was superseded by the amendments to the Uniform Parentage
Act (UPA),36 which solely adopted the first alternative given in the USCACA
upholding and regulating gestational surrogacy agreements.37 The UPA was
originally promulgated in 1973 but dealt only with artificial insemination of a
married woman.38 The purpose of the Act was to grant parenting rights to
husbands of the women who were artificially inseminated while protecting the
sperm donor against “the legal consequences of paternity.”39 After the failure of
the USCACA, the NCCUSL expanded the UPA to cover technologic advances and
redefined social standards of a family since the Act’s inception in 1973.40
The current stance of the Uniform Acts among the nation is as follows: four
states have adopted the amended UPA (2000); eighteen states still utilize the
original UPA (1973), which does not include a surrogacy provision; and only two
states have adopted the USCACA.41 In addition to these states, a number of other
states have implemented their own legislation covering surrogacy rights, but there
remains a large portion of our country that has no legislative guidance in
determining parentage in ART related births whatsoever.42
It is apparent that the states have been reluctant to adopt the various proposed
uniform provisions concerning surrogacy agreements, thus making the law
revolving around surrogacy anything but “uniform.”43
B. Treatment of Surrogacy Agreements by Individual States
Across the United States, only seventeen jurisdictions have laws in place
dealing with surrogacy contracts.44 The legislation among these jurisdictions is by

34. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 5, 9C U.L.A. 373 (2001)
35. Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right to Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform Parentage Act, 16
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 223 (2007).
36. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000), 9B U.L.A. 295 (2001).
37. Byrn, supra note 35, at 169 n.22.
38. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973), 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001); Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction
and the Law: Disharmony on a Divisive Social Issue, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 465, 466 (2006).
39. Shapo, supra note 38, at 466-67.
40. Id. at 467.
41. Id. at 468. “Of the two states that adopted the USCACA, one state adopted the version that
voided surrogacy agreements; the other adopted the version that regulated and recognized surrogacy
agreements.” Id. at 474.
42. Id. at 474-75.
43. John G. New, "Aren't You Lucky You Have Two Mamas?": Redefining Parenthood in Light of
Evolving Reproductive Technologies and Social Change, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 773, 779 (2006).
44. Chelsea VanWormer, Comment, Outdated and Ineffective: An Analysis of Michigan's
Gestational Surrogacy Law and the Need for Validation of Surrogate Pregnancy Contracts, 61 DEPAUL
L. REV. 911, 914 (2012). See also Guide to State Surrogacy Laws, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2007/12/17/3758/guide-to-state-surrogacylaws/#PS (last visited Dec. 5, 2012) (mapping the different treatment of surrogacy contracts across the
U.S. as of 2007).

2013]

NOLAN V. LABREE

813

no means uniform, ranging from outright bans to acceptance of the practice.45
Despite the clear indications of substantial market growth in ART, drawn from the
Center for Disease Control’s frequent statistical publications, few states have
changed their laws to keep pace.46
Scholars have divided this disparate patchwork of legislation across the United
States into four categories: prohibition, inaction, status regulation, and contractual
ordering.47 States prohibiting surrogacy agreements levy civil and criminal
penalties to any parties to such contracts.48 For example, in the District of
Columbia, both traditional and gestational surrogacy agreements are void and
unenforceable and punishable by a fine of up to $10,000, up to a year in jail, or
both.49
Inaction refers to states in which there are no penalties for entering into
surrogacy contracts, but the contracts will be nullified as violative of public
policy.50 While the contracts are not upheld, there may still be statutory guidance
in determining maternity and/or paternity. For instance, in Nebraska surrogacy
contracts are void and unenforceable, but there are no penalties levied upon parties
to such a contract.51 The statute still gives slight guidance on parentage, stating
that the biological father of a child born pursuant to such a contract will carry all of
the rights and obligations imposed by law to such child.52
States falling in the third category, status regulation, have implemented their
own language, or drawn from a Uniform Act, to help clarify the legal status of
parties involved in a surrogacy agreement.53 Specifically, Texas has implemented
legislation that holds gestational agreements enforceable provided that certain
requirements, creating preordained familial relationships, are met.54
The final category is one in which states have held surrogacy agreements valid
and essentially dealt with them under existing contract law.55 For example, Nevada
law allows for surrogacy agreements but requires “the respective rights of each
party” to be explicitly stated in the contract.56
Complicating the legality analysis further, the validity of surrogacy agreements
may vary throughout the states depending on a variety of factors including whether

45. London, supra note 14, at 395. See also LORD, supra note 18, at § 16:22 n.12 (listing the states’
various statutes dealing with surrogacy agreements).
46. Magdalina Gugucheva, Surrogacy in America 4, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS (2010),
available at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/KAEVEJ0A1M.pdf.
47. Emily Gelmann, "I'm Just the Oven, It's Totally Their Bun": The Power and Necessity of the
Federal Government to Regulate Commercial Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements and Protect the
Legal Rights of Intended Parents, 32 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 159, 166 (2011) (quoting Ruby L. Lee,
Note, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation, 20
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 275, 289 (2009)).
48. Id.
49. D.C. CODE §§ 16-401to -402 (2012).
50. Gelmann, supra note 47.
51. NEB.REV.STAT. ANN. § 25-21,200 (West 2012).
52. Id.
53. Gelmann, supra note 47.
54. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754 (West 2012).
55. Gelmann, supra note 47.
56. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (West 2012).
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the intended parents are married,57 whether the surrogates are compensated,58 or
whether the surrogacy is traditional or gestational.59 Some states have no statutory
language whatsoever to provide guidance for the courts in parentage issues
surrounding surrogacy, and consequently, courts must look to case law and beyond
in an attempt to mold a standard.60
In short, surrogacy agreements, both traditional and gestational, continue to
receive extremely varied treatment across the United States, and there are a myriad
of factors that may or may not play a role depending on which jurisdiction is
analyzing the controversy.
C. Surrogacy Agreements in Maine
When issues involving ART-related births and determination of parentage
arise in Maine, the courts are left to rummage through the various statutes to find
language that may help settle the controversy. One statutory instrument hanging in
the judicial tool shed is Maine’s version of the Uniform Act on Paternity of 1960
(UAP).61 However, this is not the ideal tool for the job. The purpose of the UAP
was in large part to “establish a simple and effective civil action in a court of record
to replace the antiquated ‘bastardy’ proceeding.”62 Nowhere in the UAP is
surrogacy or any type of ART-related procedure mentioned. The first successful
recorded modern surrogacy agreement in the United States, laying out the legal
rights between the intended parents and a surrogate mother, took place in 1976,63
and assisted reproductive techniques were not developed until approximately
1981.64 It is clear the UAP was not, nor could it possibly provide, adequate
guidance for a controversy involving surrogacy and parentage. While the act has a
useful purpose in some scenarios, it does not seem to be the best tool for ARTrelated parentage determinations.
Throughout Maine law, the definitions regarding the familial relationship
between parent and child are lacking. The terms “mother” and “father,” which are

57. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (West 2012) (requiring the intended parents to be married
for the existence of a valid and enforceable gestational surrogacy contract).
58. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.230 (West 2012) (“No person, organization, or agency
shall enter into, induce, arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage
contract, written or unwritten, for compensation.”).
59. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/5 (West 2012) (“Establish[ing] consistent standards and
procedural safeguards for the protection of all parties involved in a gestational surrogacy contract in
[Illinois] and . . . confirm[ing] the legal status of children born as a result of these contracts.”).
60. See supra text accompanying note 42.
61. UNIF. ACT ON PATERNITY (1960), 9C U.L.A. 1 (2001). Maine’s version of the UPA is codified
at 19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1551-1570 (2012).
62. UNIF. ACT ON PATERNITY (1960), 9C U.L.A. 1 (2001).
63. History of Surrogacy, INFORMATION ON SURROGACY, http://www.information-onsurrogacy.com/history-of-surrogacy.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2012). Surrogacy has been in existence
for a very long time, one of the first recorded instances seen in the bible when an Egyptian handmaiden
carried a child, Ishmael, for Abraham and Sarah. (Genesis 16:1-16). These instances of “old fashioned”
surrogacies were rarely spoken about and often not recorded. History of Surrogacy, INFORMATION ON
SURROGACY, http://www.information-on-surrogacy.com/history-of-surrogacy.html (last visited Dec. 5,
2012).
64. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 9.
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used throughout Maine’s UAP, are not defined in any way.65 Looking to the
definitions contained in Maine’s probate code does not provide much more
insight.66 The unexplained assumptions revealed by the explicit language
contained throughout Maine law—that the child has only two parents, and that
those parents are of opposite sex—are evidence of the void in statutory guidance on
the topic.67
The absence of statutory guidance in this arena has not gone unnoticed. In
December of 2002, the Uniform Parentage Act,68 comprehensively addressing the
issue of parentage in ART-related births, was presented to Maine’s legislature for
consideration.69 The lengthy and complex bill did not come to fruition and has not
been reconsidered since its initial presentation.70
In sum, Maine falls into the category of states with no laws dealing directly
with surrogacy or ART. If posed with a controversy, the courts are left with no
statutory direction to fashion an equitable result and establish an appropriate
precedent. The courts may choose to look to other jurisdictions or to uniform laws
that have not yet been adopted by Maine. As mentioned previously, however, the
law across the country is far from settled in this arena and, consequently, the
resulting treatment of these parentage issues dwells in the unknown.
III. THE NOLAN DECISION
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
In Nolan v. LaBree,71 Robert and Celia Nolan brought an action requesting a
declaratory judgment by the court affirming their legal parentage of a newborn
baby, Desmond, born through the ART method known as gestational surrogacy.72
The defendants, Kristen and Jeffery Labree, were the listed parents on the birth
certificate filed with the Department of Health and Human Services, but had no
genetic relation to Desmond.73 Kristen was the physical birth mother but was
acting as a gestational surrogate,74 carrying Celia’s egg that had been fertilized via
65. John C. Sheldon, Surrogate Mothers, Gestational Carriers, and a Pragmatic Adaptation of the
Uniform Parentage Act of 2000, 53 ME. L. REV. 523, 525 n.9 (2001).
66. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 1-201(3) (2012) (“‘Child’ includes any individual entitled to take as a child
under this Code by intestate succession from the parent whose relationship is involved and excludes any
person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild or any more remote descendant.”); id. § 1201(28) (“‘Parent’ includes any person entitled to take, or who would be entitled to take if the child died
without a will, as a parent under this Code by intestate succession from the child whose relationship is in
question and excludes any person who is only a stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent.”).
67. Sheldon, supra note 65.
68. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 2012).
69. John Sheldon, The Good News, and Some Bad News, About the Uniform Parentage Act of 2002,
18 ME. B.J. 94, 94 (2003).
70. John C. Sheldon, Test Tube Babies Meet Stone Age Statutes, 27 ME. B.J. 140, 140 n.1 (2012).
71. 2012 ME 61, 52 A.3d 923.
72. Brief of Appellants at 1, Nolan v. LaBree, 2012 ME 61, 52 A.3d 923 (No. Pen-11-393)
[hereinafter Brief of Appellants]. The case was first brought to a Case Management Conference where
the presiding Magistrate, determining he lacked authority to grant such declaratory relief, scheduled the
case to be heard by a District Court Judge. Id.
73. Nolan, 2012 ME 61, ¶ 2, 52 A.3d 923.
74. See supra note 2 (defining gestational surrogacy).
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in vitro fertilization75 with sperm from Celia’s husband, Robert.76 From the outset,
all parties were in agreement that the Nolans should be declared the legal parents as
evidenced by the gestational carrier agreement,77 the Labrees’ answer to the
original complaint,78 and the arguments presented in the appellate briefs.79 The
District Court determined the paternity of Desmond, declaring Robert Nolan as the
father, but found that no statutory authority existed in Maine permitting a court’s
determination of maternity and, consequently, the court refused to declare Celia
Nolan as the mother.80
The court did, however, declare Celia the de facto mother of the child and
“awarded sole parental rights and responsibilities to the Nolans.”81 A de facto
parent defined in Black’s Law Dictionary is “[a]n adult who . . . is not the child’s
legal parent . . . [and] [b]ecause the status of de facto parent is subordinate to that
of legal parent, a person who expects to be afforded the status of parent should, if
possible, adopt the child.”82 Rather than being left to adopt the child that was
genetically theirs,83 the Nolans appealed to the Law Court, which found the
requisite statutory authority to declare maternity within the UAP and accordingly
vacated the judgment of the District Court,84 remanding “for a judgment that Celia
Nolan is the mother . . . and that the Labrees are not the parents of [Desmond].”85

75. In vitro fertilization is defined by the American Pregnancy Association as the “process of
fertilization by manually combining an egg and sperm in a laboratory dish.” In Vitro Fertilization: IVF,
AMERICAN PREGNANCY ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/infertility/ivf.html (last
visited Dec. 5, 2012). The embryo is then transferred to a carrier that provides an environment for
growth and eventual birth of the child. Id.
76. Nolan, 2012 ME 61, ¶ 2, 52 A.3d 923.
77. Brief of Appellants, supra note 72, at 3 (“In the Contract, Kristen Labree and Jeffery Labree
stated that they had no intention of parenting the child and did not want to parent the child.”); Brief of
Appellees at 2, Nolan v. LaBree, 2012 ME 61, 52 A.3d 923 (No. Pen-11-393) [hereinafter Brief of
Appellees] (adopting the same statement from the brief of Appellants).
78. Brief of Appellants, supra note 72, (explaining that on the same day the original complaint was
filed, the Labrees issued an answer agreeing with the Nolans’ requested relief).
79. Id. at 4 (“The intention of the parties is, and always has been, that the Intended Parents are
established as the legal parents of Desmond and that Kristen Labree and Jeffery Labree have no legal
rights or responsibilities whatsoever regarding this child.”).
80. Nolan, 2012 ME 61, ¶ 3, 52 A.3d 923.
81. Id.
82. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1222. There are a few Maine cases that provide
guidance but do not provide a strict definition of ‘de facto parents.’ See C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME
43, 845 A.2d 1146; Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 761 A.2d 291.
83. There are additional reasons why adoption in gestational surrogacy cases is a less desirable
route for intended parents to embark upon. John C. Sheldon’s Amicus Brief views the problem with
adoption as “four-fold” containing jurisdictional problems, constitutional issues, increased cost and
delay, and judicial policy complications. Brief of Amicus Curiae John C. Sheldon at 7-9, Nolan v.
LaBree, 2012 ME 61, 52 A.3d 923 (No. Pen-11-393) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae John C.
Sheldon]. Also, it should be noted that “the rights of the de facto parent (Celia Nolan under the District
Court’s ruling) can be impacted or limited by the right of the “true” parent (Kristen Labree under said
ruling.).” Brief of Appellees, supra note 77, at 3.
84. Nolan, 2012 ME 61, ¶ 1, 52 A.3d 923.
85. Id. ¶ 7.
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B. Arguments of the Parties
On appeal, the Nolans argued that the courts are permitted to utilize equitable
powers pursuant to declaratory judgments to determine maternity.86 The Nolans
further contended that “[b]y stating that Robert Nolan is the legal father, but not
allowing Celia Nolan to be declared the legal mother, the District Court's refusal to
acknowledge its inherent power could violate the equal protection clause of the
United States and Maine Constitutions by treating similar situated persons
differently.”87
The Nolans recognized that, under the statute regarding registration of live
births,88 the legal mother is the woman who physically births the child, but
highlighted an exception that allows for a court of competent jurisdiction to declare
otherwise.89 They argued that the court has the ability, and should indeed exercise
said ability, to interpret the statutory language in a “gender neutral fashion” so as to
avoid issues of constitutionality.90
The Appellees, the Labrees, joined the Nolans in all of their arguments,
reiterating that Maine Law explicitly allows for gender neutral interpretation of
statutory language in instances such as these.91 The Labrees noted the
advancements taking place in reproductive technology and urged the court to adapt
by allowing for maternity determinations where the parties are similarly situated.92
Furthermore, the Labrees articulated that the district court’s declaration that Celia
Nolan is the de facto mother simply was not adequate, explaining that “the rights of
the de facto parent (Celia Nolan under the district court's ruling) can be impacted or
limited by the right of the “true” parent (Kristen Labree under said ruling.)”93
C. Decisions of the Court
In a concise opinion, the Court points out that there exists statutory authority
for courts to declare parentage and further finds that even though the language
granting such authority lies within the “Uniform Act on Paternity,” a presumption
is drawn that the legislature’s use of the gender-neutral word ‘parentage’ was
intentional and, therefore, requisite authority exists for courts to determine not only
paternity, but maternity as well.94

86. Brief of Appellants, supra note 72, at 4.
87. Id. at 5.
88. 22 M.R.S.A. § 2761 (2004 & Supp. 2012).
89. Id. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 72, at 9-10.
90. Brief of Appellants, supra note 71, at 18. See also 1 M.R.S.A. § 71(7-A)(B) (1989 & Supp.
2012) (recognizing that “the Revisor of Statutes shall be authorized to change any masculine or
feminine gender word to a gender-neutral word when it is clear that the statute is not exclusively
applicable to members of one sex”); Danforth v. Emmons, 124 Me. 156, 126 A. 821, 823 (1924)
(finding authority to construe masculine language, ‘his heirs,’ as including both genders for the purposes
of the Death-Liability Act of 1891).
91. Brief of Appellees, supra note 77, at 3.
92. Id. at 4.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Nolan v. LaBree, 2012 ME 61, ¶ 4, 52 A.3d 923. The court explained how 19-A M.R.S. § 1556
provides the requisite statutory basis for both paternity and maternity declarations. Id.
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Before the opinion was issued, the Law Court invited amici briefs on the
issue95 and received several in response, all of which argued for a declaration of
parentage for the genetic parents to the exclusion of the gestational carrier and her
spouse.96 The brevity of the opinion reflects the caution with which the court
approached the issue, ultimately providing an equitable outcome for the parties, but
crafting the decision in a narrow manner, seemingly to avoid delving into a
complicated and controversial issue involving surrogacy rights in Maine.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Need for Change
Nolan illustrates but one problem involving ART-related births and
determining parentage. While the outcome of Nolan is proper, and steps are being
taken in the right direction, the opinion and consequently the precedent it sets, is
extremely narrow. The legislature has avoided promulgating laws regarding
parentage in ART cases, but this case signals that it is time further action be taken
to bring Maine’s parentage statutes into the twenty-first century.
While political controversy has hindered many courts across the nation from
adopting legislation on the topic it is apparent that assisted reproductive techniques
are growing in both use and acceptance. Allowing for the possibility of parenthood
that otherwise would not be available for a variety of people has proved to be an
extremely attractive benefit of the procedures, increasing the use and popularity of
the techniques exponentially since their foundations. The growth, as evidenced by
the statistics surrounding use97 as well as the drastic increase in facilities and
businesses providing ART-related services,98 is undeniable. With the benefits and
increase in usage, surrogacy has received much publicity and is almost considered
commonplace.99
With this movement, there is a mutation of social norms and what constitutes a
family unit. Defining the modern family has become an intricate task with the use
of surrogacy, as evidenced by Nolan, where there were arguably four parents of the
child upon birth: the gestational carrier, the carrier’s husband, and the two who
provided the genetic material for the baby. As our society changes and affords new
opportunities for parenthood, it is important that the governing law keeps pace and
95. Matthew Pollack, Maine Supreme Judicial Court Sitting as the Law Court Public Notice, STATE
29, 2012),
http://www.courts.state.me.us/news_reference/news/current/amicus_surrogacy_022912.html.
96. Amicus Brief of Appellants, American Society for Reproductive Medicine, et al. at 33, Nolan v.
LaBree, 2012 ME 61, 52 A.3d 923 (No. Pen-11-393) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of Appellants]; Amici
Brief of Concerned Maine Attorneys, at 17, Nolan v. LaBree, 2012 ME 61, 52 A.3d 923 (No. Pen-11393) [hereinafter Amici Brief of Concerned Maine Attorneys]; Brief of Amicus Curiae John C. Sheldon,
supra note 83, at 21; Brief of Amicus Curiae Maine Attorney General, at 8-9, Nolan v. LaBree, 2012
ME 61, 52 A.3d 923 (No. Pen-11-393) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae Maine Attorney General].
97. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
98. Mark Hansen, . . . and Baby makes Litigation: As Surrogacy Becomes More Popular, Legal
Problems Proliferate, 97 A.B.A. J. 52, 54 (2011) (describing the sharp increase of new businesses in the
field such as fertility clinics, surrogacy agencies, and online brokers).
99. Id. (noting that many famous names have utilized the technique and openly endorse its benefits,
including Elton John, Sarah Jessica Parker, and Nicole Kidman).
OF MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH: LATEST NEWS & ANNOUNCEMENTS (Feb.
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that we “match familial complexity with statutory sophistication.”100
Furthermore, the disparate treatment across the United States, where surrogacy
agreements may be criminalized in one state but valid in a neighboring state, leads
to a great deal of forum shopping.101 While this may drive a parent’s decision to
seek a surrogacy contract in another jurisdiction, it could lead to a throng of legal
complications unforeseen by the unwary.102 Even if the parties agree as to the
choice of state law, there are circumstances in which the court will not be bound by
such a stipulation.103 In Maine, where the law is silent on gestational agreements,
parties may be enticed to engage in such forum shopping, which may yield
beneficial results, but can get tricky and should be handled with the utmost care.104
This recommended caution involved with proceeding in this manner undoubtedly
will be a greater burden on the potential parent(s), in the form of legal fees, risk,
and even increased prices for surrogacy services.
B. Effecting Change In Maine
Keeping our law up to date and relevant to the society in which we live can be
accomplished by implementing legislation or through common law. As we have
seen, legislation has been avoided in this area and the court in Nolan was forced to
step in. However, common law should not be the first choice for the vehicle in
which we modernize our parentage laws in Maine. The Supreme Court reminds us
that “legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the
people”105 and that “the power to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen
family life . . . is committed . . . to the legislature of that State.”106 Important issues
that involve such a personal matter as surrogate parenting are therefore best left in
the hands of the legislature and the public. The task of adjusting Maine law to the
technological advancements in reproduction should not be solely imposed on a
handful of judges.
Furthermore, it takes time for the common law surrounding a specific topic to
develop; precedent will be set as controversies arise. There is no preemptive
decision-making and, consequently, law will not be fashioned until problems occur.
This leaves little guidance for individuals who wish to benefit from ART,
effectively creating additional encumbrances in the form of increased legal and
100. Sheldon, supra note 69.
101. Brock A. Patton, Note, Buying a Newborn: Globalization and the Lack of Federal Regulation
of Commercial Surrogacy Contracts, 79 UMKC L. REV. 507, 522 (2010).
102. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of Laws, 1990 WIS. L.
REV. 399, 399 (1990) (discussing the complications that may arise when residents of a state that does
not recognize surrogacy agreements attempt to conduct all or part of the surrogacy transaction in a state
that permits such agreements by using hypothetical situations of a couple residing in a state where
surrogacy agreements are not recognized).
103. JOAN ROSS WILDER, 17 WEST'S PA. PRAC., Family Law § 26:8 (7th ed. 2012) (explaining that
“[p]arentage may be dependent upon how a jurisdiction views the relationship between two adults
raising the child”).
104. Id. See generally J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1265-66 (Pa. Super. 2006) (illustrating just how
complicated a surrogacy agreement can become where the intended parents, the surrogacy broker, the
egg-donor, and the gestational surrogate all resided in different states).
105. Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
106. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971).
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financial risk. Even when courts are confronted with a specific issue, the opinion
may shy away from crafting in-depth precedent and provide only a narrow holding
that does little to elucidate matters for others in the future whose circumstances
may differ in the slightest. Conversely, legislation on the issue will provide the
optimal amount of clarity. Statutory language directly addressing issues will be the
most effective form of guidance for both the courts and individuals who may wish
to pursue this method of child birth.
Still, it is not without concern that legislation is recommended. It is
acknowledged that this suggestion of legislative action has been proposed to
Maine’s lawmakers in the past, in the form of the UPA proposal of 2002, and has
not been revisited since.107 Rather than tender a similar proposal, which may not
fare well with lawmakers, the ultimate recommendation of this Note is for minimal
legislative action, easing our state into the waters of modern familial complexities.
Although surrogacy law throughout our nation is a “crazy quilt of laws,”108
gestational surrogacy agreements, as opposed to traditional surrogacy agreements,
are treated more favorably, as the surrogate has no biological relationship
whatsoever to the child.109 No matter where a child is born in the United States,
“[a] woman who gives birth to a child using her own egg is legally presumed to be
the child's mother.”110 This presumption can create complications when litigating a
determination for parentage and consequently, attorneys are hesitant to get
involved in traditional surrogacy arrangements, some turning down representation
in such cases all together, no matter the circumstances.111
To implement legislation recognizing gestational surrogacy agreements, by
explicitly allowing for a judicial decree that validates the contract, seems less of a
stretch for Maine’s legislature than adopting comprehensive language on ARTrelated issues such as the UPA. In looking for guidance we can turn to states such
as our neighbor, New Hampshire. New Hampshire’s applicable statute, which
allows for judicial preauthorization of parentage, provides for “the automatic
termination of the parental rights of the surrogate and her husband, if any, after the
birth of a child born as a result of the arrangement and a vesting of those rights
solely in the intended parents.”112
Of course the legislature must additionally define what will be considered a
legitimate gestational surrogacy agreement. New Hampshire dealt with this by
implementing certain requirements that need to be met before the order validating
the contract can be issued: the parties to the contract must first meet certain
eligibility requirements, the contract must be in the best interest of the child, there
are no unconscionable terms in the contract, there are certain mandatory provisions
in the agreement, and finally, the petitioners must have undergone evaluations and
107. Sheldon, supra note 70.
108. Hansen, supra note 98.
109. See Darra L. Hofman, "Mama's Baby, Daddy's Maybe:" A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy
Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 453 (2009).
110. Hansen, supra note 98, at 56-57 (quoting Chicago attorney Nidhi Desai, who specializes in
reproductive technologies).
111. Id. at 57 (quoting New York attorney Elizabeth Swire Falker on her attitude toward traditional
surrogacy agreements: “I wouldn't touch one with a 10-foot pole”).
112. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:23 (2002).
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counseling determining they are fit for parentage.113 These regulations placed on
the surrogacy contract all serve public policy purposes recognized by New
Hampshire and its residents and should be considered by Maine’s legislature. This
Note advocates adopting New Hampshire’s structure of a gestational agreement or,
in the alternative, using New Hampshire’s statute as a starting point for public
discussion on what, if any, regulations should be integrated into Maine’s definition
of a legitimate gestational surrogacy agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
Maine should take narrow legislative action permitting courts to recognize and
uphold agreements under circumstances where all parties are in agreement and
have contractually consented to a gestational surrogacy agreement. This would in
turn have the effect of automatically terminating the parental rights of the surrogate
and her husband, if any, upon the child’s birth. Although Nolan dealt with a
judicial termination after the birth of the child, whereas the suggested legislation
would provide an action for judicial preauthorization, had it been available to the
parties before the birth of baby Desmond, it would have undoubtedly solved this
parentage problem swiftly and equitably.
Limited legislative action creating a method for judicial preauthorization of
parentage where a gestational contract exists and that meets minimal requirements
befitting Maine’s public policy would be a suitable “baby-step” in ushering in a
new era of familial complexity. With the incongruent patchwork of laws
surrounding surrogacy in the United States, finding ways to accomplish ART births
is far from impossible for any family; creating statutory language that provides
guidelines for our state’s citizens will benefit all and harm none. It is imperative
that we keep pace with technology and society and provide clarity for our citizenry,
especially in the field of family law. While perhaps the legislature is not yet ready
for a full adaptation of ART-related issues, movement must be made forward and
progress taken toward matching Maine’s legal with its societal environment.

113. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17, B:23 (2002).

